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Abstract 
This chapter explores how political anthropology can contribute to understanding, and 
challenging, the multiple forms of postdemocracy that have arisen in recent decades. 
Ethnographic research demonstrates how postdemocratic governance can be 
immensely harmful, as it is frequently underpinned by dynamics quite different to the 
beneficent principles it purports to embody. This discovery in itself can empower 
anthropologists to make important critical interventions. But political anthropology 
also clarifies how postdemocratic arrangements actually arise. It moves us beyond 
simplistic portraits of postdemocracy as grounded in ‘economic power’ or ‘a turn to 
expertise’, instead illuminating the complex processes by which different private (and 
public) interests gain leverage in both policy-making processes and citizens’ political 
aspirations. These insights do not just make for better causal explanations of political 
transformations. They are also a vital resource for activism, enabling us to explore 
alternatives to postdemocracy that are responsive to the concerns of the people we 
work with, rather than—or perhaps as well as—our own. The chapter illustrates these 
arguments with examples drawn from Brazil, the United States, and the author’s own 
research in Indonesia. 
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Imagine walking down the road in Boston, as anthropologist Jeffrey Juris (2012) once 
did, flanked on every side by protestors chanting ‘We are the 99%!’ A woman in a 
headscarf turns and looks you in the eye. ‘You are the 99%,’ she tells you. 
Disconcerted but intrigued, you wander to their headquarters, the #Occupy camp in 
Dewey Square—a bustling tent city thrumming with the energy of workshops and 
performances. Each evening, the camp plaza fills with hundreds of people for a 
‘General Assembly’ where a complex process of consensus decision-making unfolds, 
facilitated via hand gestures and speakers’ stacks to ensure the process is as inclusive 
as possible. This assembly, occupiers tell you, embodies an alternative to the current 
political order where decisions are disproportionately influenced by the 1%. By taking 
part you are engaging in prefigurative politics: honing within your social movement 
alternative dispositions towards, and even alternative forms of, sociality and political 
practice, thereby embodying the change that you want to see in the world. You are, 
following Graeber (2013), embodying ‘democracy’. 
 
Next, imagine living in the UK and being cajoled by your neighbour to join the local 
branch of Momentum: a grassroots movement seeking to democratically invigorate 
the country’s Labour Party in the wake of leftwinger Jeremy Corbyn’s 2015 election 
as Leader of the Opposition, with a view to creating ‘a more democratic, equal and 
decent society’.i Like #Occupy, Momentum is prefigurative. It seeks to ‘demonstrate 
on a micro level how collective action and Labour values can transform our society 
for the better’.ii And like #Occupy, it’s exciting. Yet something about each of these 
two movements confuses you.  
Why would your party or country need democratic revitalization? Don’t you 
already live in a democracy? 
 Or perhaps you are not so naïve as to believe that you live in a true democracy 
any more. Perhaps you just find yourself wondering: what went wrong? 
 
 
The Postdemocratic Moment 
 
In recent years, terms such as ‘postdemocracy’ and ‘the post-political’ have become 
increasingly widespread in the works of political theorists, geographers and 
sociologists. Terms of diagnosis, they are most classically associated with the writings 
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of Jacques Rancière (1995, 1998, 2006), Colin Crouch (2004) and Chantal Mouffe 
(2005), who use them to describe a transformation they have observed in the statecraft 
and political culture of ‘advanced democracies’ in Western Europe, North America, 
and the Asia-Pacific. Although such societies may appear to be democratic, and even 
present themselves as role models for emulation by ‘transitional democracies’ 
elsewhere, postdemocracy theorists argue that they are in fact becoming increasingly 
illiberal. While elections in postdemocratic societies may be regular, free and fair, 
they offer remarkably little capacity for citizens to steer the course of the political 
process. Parties vying for votes, it is suggested, have converged upon the centre-
ground—certainly when compared to the ideological battles of Left vs. Right that 
characterised European politics in the mid-late twentieth century (Ramsay 2012: 223). 
With most major parties having embraced a ‘neoliberal consensus’, electorates 
essentially get to choose between various models of tax and spend. While the 
differences between those models are not insignificant, citizens have very few 
opportunities to voice opposition to a model of ‘regulatory statecraft’ in which 
economic growth is valorised as the primary indicator of political success and policy-
making powers are increasingly delegated to technical bodies independent from the 
electoral process (Crouch forthcoming; Palumbo 2010). Moreover, numerous recent 
events demonstrate that even policies for which governments have been given a clear 
democratic mandate may be summarily discarded by politicians once in office.iii Such 
developments reflect a broader crisis of political representation at the heart of 
postdemocratic societies, in which popular opinion and the concerns of everyday life 
have far less bearing on government policy than the views of ‘experts’ and the 
demands of corporate lobbyists, contributing in turn to a public disengagement from 
politics. For political theorists who see widespread civic participation in political life 
and agonism—the vibrant clash of opposed views and interests—as lying at the heart 
of a well-functioning democracy, this is a matter of grave concern. 
 
Such arguments may perhaps read less persuasively in 2017 (the time of writing) than 
they would have done in the 1990s and 2000s, when most of the seminal work on 
postdemocracy was published. In many advanced democracies, political voices which 
challenge the received wisdoms of neoliberal globalisation are now more dominant in 
mainstream politics than they have been for decades. In some cases these voices 
advocate forms of what Crouch (forthcoming) labels ‘egalitarian conservative 
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nationalism’, evident in the anti-globalisation of France’s Front National, or the 
‘Make America Great Again’ protectionism of Donald Trump. In others, they 
advocate a radical politics of anti-austerity—seen in Greece’s SYRIZA, Spain’s 
Podemos, and the wellsprings of support in the UK and USA for Leftist figures such 
as Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders. Yet theorists of postdemocracy note whilst 
alternative political visions may be emerging in the public sphere, this does not mean 
that they are readily achievable in practice. In the realpolitik of a postdemocratic 
world, many parties are forced to either ‘sacriﬁce sharpness of focus and campaigning 
zeal for the bland middle-ground strategies of postdemocratic politics in order to gain 
public ofﬁce’ or ‘sacriﬁce the chance of wielding governmental power in order to 
maintain their uncompromising vision’ (Crouch 2016: 73; see also Dommett 2016). 
Even the apparent exception to this claim—Donald Trump—has, in the early months 
of his Presidency, encountered remarkable difficulties in delivering the policies for 
which he received an electoral mandate. His rise to power, meanwhile, has been 
predicated on such a ‘degradation of key democratic values’ (such as rational and 
truthful debate), and such contempt for classic democratic checks and balances (e.g. 
the press), that many commentators have interpreted his electoral success as a further 
evisceration of democracy (Chugrov 2017: 42; Giroux 2016; Giroux and 
Bhattacharya forthcoming; Hobson forthcoming). 
 
Diagnoses of postdemocracy are not, however, restricted to ‘advanced democracies’. 
The example of Thailand is a case in point. When Thaksin Sinawatra and his Thai 
Rak Thai (TRT) party campaigned on a policy platform that promised national health 
insurance and a ‘Keynesian’ approach to public spending, he shot to power with a 
tremendous public mandate. Rather than accepting this, however, opposition groups 
who were unable to defeat TRT at the polls instead mobilized to ‘get Thaksin out of 
office by other means’—culminating, in 2006, in a military coup (Glassman 2007: 
2038). Although less subtle than the creeping evisceration of popular sovereignty in 
Western nations, the Thai example demonstrates a fundamentally similar kind of 
process: 
 
In the United States the circle has been squared by figuring out 
complicated means of transforming majority votes and majority opinions 
into losing candidates and losing political pro-positions. In Thailand, 
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where certain majority opinions were in some ways being expressed 
through state policies, the circle was squared through the more blunt and 
well-worn strategy of coup d’état (Glassman 2007: 2039). 
 
Makinda (2004: 17-19) argues that since many African governments are currently 
‘kept honest by, and made accountable to, external authorities [external governments, 
institutions, and agencies] rather than their own people,’ their citizens ‘theoretically 
possess civil and political rights, but, in reality… lack the power and influence that 
ordinary people exercise in a developed country’. Such a situation, in his view ‘is not 
a democracy but a post-democracy’. My own work in Indonesia (Long 2016) uses the 
term slightly differently, in the context of popular turns towards authoritarian 
strongman leadership, which political scientists have often framed as evidence of 
‘democratic rollback’ or inadequate ‘consolidation’. In my view they are better 
understood as ‘postdemocratic’ phenomena—because the choice to abandon 
democratic ideals and endorse authoritarianism is made after (and often because of) 
the experience of democracy. Yet whatever label one prefers, this too represents a a 
tendency in contemporary politics worldwide to replace democratic commitments to 
representation and opposition with what Pabst (2016: 91) has described as ‘novel 
forms of illiberal authoritarianism’.   
 
As this brief overview reveals, it may be more appropriate to talk of 
‘postdemocracies’ than of ‘postdemocracy’. There are considerable differences 
between each of the aforementioned contexts, and these warrant detailed comparative 
analysis. Nevertheless, they all share a distinctive unifying feature. In each case, de 
facto sovereignty has been, or is in the process of being, stripped from (or surrendered 
by) the demos. This is not to say that popular sovereignty was ever a fully realized 
principle. Democratic states have always been able to betray their principles or 
override public opinion when they felt it was necessary to maintaining the integrity of 
their nation (Remmer 1995; Runciman 2013), and indeed there is a compelling line of 
argument which holds that it is not possible to realize true ‘democracy’ within the 
context of a state (Graeber 2013). From this point of view, the nomenclature 
‘postdemocracy’ seems a nonsense; we have never been democratic (Mendieta 2015). 
Nevertheless, discernible changes can be observed in terms of the declining influence 
that public opinion is having on political decision-making, and it is that phenomenon 
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which stands at the heart of this chapter. I approach it with four questions in mind: 
why is this happening; what are its consequences; what, if anything, can political 
anthropology contribute to the existing debates on such matters in political theory and 
political science; and is postdemocracy a development on which anthropologists can, 
should, or must take a stance?  
 
 
A Dilemma for Political Anthropology 
 
Postdemocracy presents certain difficulties for political anthropologists who want to 
write about it—difficulties that stem from the direction that anthropology’s 
intellectual trajectory has taken over the past forty years. Social anthropology, at least 
within the British tradition, had initially been conceived as an empirical science, the 
task of which was to document empirically observable social relations and practices, 
and derive from these data testable hypotheses about the laws that governed social life 
in diverse societies (see e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1952). Yet in the late twentieth-century, 
this vision of the discipline came under heavy fire. Postcolonial, black and feminist 
interventions revealed that, although ethnographers often wrote in a style that 
suggested they were detached, ‘objective’ observers, they were actually nothing of the 
sort (see e.g. Asad 1973; Gerrit Huizer and Mannheim 1979; Harding 1987; Harrison 
1991). Anthropologists’ gender, race, and associations with colonial power, critics 
argued, had enabled them to access certain kinds of data whilst precluding them from 
accessing others; their accounts might not be inaccurate, but they were certainly 
‘partial’ (Clifford 1986: 7). Anthropological knowledge, in other words, was not 
absolute but situated – what one could know depended on what one was able to know 
from the confines of a given subject position (Haraway 1988).  
 
Such interventions did not only encourage anthropologists to become more self-
conscious in their research and writing, they also led to the politics of knowledge 
becoming a dominant theme within anthropological research. As Foucault (1980: 80) 
observed, the 1960s and 1970s had been marked by an ‘increasing vulnerability to 
criticism of things, institutions, practices, [and] discourses’. Dominant, systematising 
and formal bodies of knowledge were being contested by newly insurrectionist 
‘subjugated knowledges’—a term he used to refer to, firstly, the details and tensions 
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that had been glossed over and concealed within mainstream theories, and, secondly, 
‘knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task’. It was through 
the ‘reappearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these 
disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work’ (1980: 82). Having been 
subject to such criticism themselves, anthropologists came to reconceptualise their 
research as a tool by which further criticism could be accomplished. By conducting 
ethnographic studies with marginalised populations, anthropologists could tap directly 
into hitherto subjugated knowledges, using what they learned to challenge received 
wisdoms and call institutionalized forms of knowledge into question. Meanwhile, 
anthropological research with experts and elites could shed light into the means by 
which official, legitimate knowledge was constructed and maintained, shedding light 
on its blind-spots and revealing the partiality of its perspective.  
 
Having styled itself as a critical discipline committed to putting diverse forms of 
knowledge into agonistic dialogue, however, anthropology faces a dilemma when it 
comes to writing about postdemocracy. On the one hand, any anthropologist who 
shares this mainstream disciplinary ethic cannot but be opposed to postdemocracy, an 
authoritarian political form that subjugates and stifles oppositional forms of 
knowledge in the name of consensus managerialism. On the other hand, existing 
scholarly conversations on postdemocracy tend to pin their flags to various pre-
determined and normative models of democracy in ways that anthropologists may not 
be comfortable advocating. These models will, after all, contain their own 
problematic assumptions and blind-spots that are in need of critique, whilst the 
discipline’s emphasis on description and analysis at the expense of normative debate 
means that relatively few anthropologists have been versed in the intellectual art of 
adjudicating between multiple, flawed, political systems.iv It is consequently all too 
easy, when thinking through one’s materials, to fear that one ‘stands for nothing’, that 
one is becoming an apologist for postdemocracy, or, alternatively, that one is lapsing 
into pro-democratic imperialism. Seminar audiences may challenge the anthropologist 
of postdemocracy to declare ‘their politics’, or enquire as to ‘whose side’ they are 
really on. I speak from experience: it can be an awkward business.  
 
In this chapter, I seek to reclaim that awkwardness as productive source of insight by 
developing a dual strategy of critical engagement. While stopping short of proposing 
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a preferred model of political organization, I show how political anthropology is 
uniquely placed to prove the shortcomings of postdemocratic governance. 
Ethnographic research demonstrates clearly that postdemocracy can be immensely 
harmful, and moreover reveals that it is frequently underpinned by dynamics quite 
different to the beneficent principles it purports to embody. This allows 
anthropologists to develop critical interventions that might help rein in 
postdemocracy’s worst excesses, if not transcend it altogether. On the other hand, by 
engaging empathetically with postdemocratic actors, their motives and concerns, the 
ethnographic encounter often enables political anthropologists to develop much more 
nuanced understandings of why postdemocracy takes hold in particular settings than 
the grand narratives peddled by political theorists. These insights do not just make for 
better causal explanations. They are also a vital resource for activism, enabling us to 
explore alternatives to postdemocracy that are responsive to the concerns of the 
people we work with, rather than—or perhaps as well as—our own.  
 
 
Corporate Postdemocracy 
 
For Colin Crouch (2004), a key factor underpinning the turn to postdemocracy has 
been the rise of what he calls ‘the global firm’, i.e. the increasing political influence 
of multinational corporations following the transition to post-Fordist regimes of 
accumulation (Harvey 1990). Corporations, he argues, have been able to strong-arm 
governments into developing policies that favour their own interests rather than the 
wishes of the demos. The clearest examples of this are cases where governments 
capitulate to perceived or actual threats of capital flight, abandoning policies that may 
be popular with the citizenry—from generous labour protections to the imposition of 
‘corporate death penalties’v—in order to maintain profitable levels of corporate 
investment. As Stark (1998: 76) notes, this can be a particularly acute concern for 
developing nations in the Global South, where the appetite for foreign direct 
investment also forces governments to develop economic (and other) policies that will 
be endorsed by major financial institutions and thereby be considered ‘low-risk’ and 
‘attractive’ by investors. Such developments have led some anthropologists to 
propose that we are living in times where de facto sovereignty—the capacity to kill, 
discipline or punish with impunity—now resides not with the state, let alone the 
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demos, but rather with corporations and the market (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). 
Given that relocation is often, however, extremely costly to a corporation (Crouch 
2004: 34) anthropological perspectives could allow us to better understand the 
rhetorical and cultural processes by which the threat of capital flight comes to 
overshadow government decision making, in short the mechanisms by which capital’s 
claims to sovereignty get ratified by its audience (Rutherford 2012).  
 
However, it is also important not to overstate this particular dimension of 
postdemocracy. In most cases, private interests are recognised ahead of public 
mandates not because of bullyboy ultimatums but as a result of extensive lobbying. 
Though structural factors contribute to this—not least because corporations can 
typically invest considerably more resources into lobbying that civil associations can 
(see also Barley 2010)—lobbying activities only prove successful insofar as they 
become compelling to government actors working within a dominant paradigm of an 
economized public good (Bear and Mathur 2015). Thus, in a world where, as 
anthropologists Holston and Caldeira (1998) have argued, the multiple goals of an 
‘ideal’ democracyvi frequently stand in tension with each other and invariably proceed 
at differential rates, corporate power draws its force in part from a broader cultural 
commitment to prioritizing socioeconomic dimensions of democratic citizenship over 
political dimensions. I emphasise the cultural character of this commitment here to 
highlight that it is not inevitable; alternative visions of the public good might 
prioritise different aspects of democratic citizenship very differently. But public 
servants give emphasis to the socioeconomic because, in the particular historical and 
geographic conditions in which they are operating, it feels right for them to do so, and 
because they imagine (not incorrectly) that economic growth is also a priority for 
many citizens. Postdemocratic practice is facilitated, even legitimised, by the values 
and systems of meaning that are in broad circulation within contemporary societies. 
Anthropological studies have an important contribution to make in accounting for 
such a situation—explaining, for instance, how important the democratization of 
consumption has become to many citizens’ sense of self-worth, linkage to, and 
equality with others (Douglas and Isherwood 1996; see e.g. James 2014). However, 
even when such attitudes predominate, the fact that corporations depend so heavily on 
lobbying activities means that it would be quite wrong to conceptualise the state as a 
mere ‘instrument of capital’ (cf. Harvey 2007). Lobbying is a risky business. It can 
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fail. Governmental and bureaucratic compliance with any given corporate demand is 
far from assured. In other words, while corporate lobbyists may have a 
disproportionate opportunity to have their voices heard, the decision to act on those 
voices emerges not only out of contextually specific cultural logics but also out of 
relational dynamics that warrant detailed ethnographic investigation. 
  
 
Example 1: The Tax Alliance, USA  
In 1999, Denise Benoit, a sociologist, conducted ethnographic fieldwork 
with a women-only policy discussion group that she calls the ‘Tax 
Alliance’. A small, exclusive group, membership is restricted to female 
workers in either government or business who spend over 90 per cent of 
their time working on tax issues. Public sector workers are admitted 
automatically, but private sector employees (a mixture of corporate-
government relations officials, trade association representatives, lawyers, 
and consultants) faced long waiting lists if they wanted to join. In addition 
to monthly meetings where ‘useful information’ about what business and 
government are planning is reciprocally exchanged the Alliance also holds 
an annual retreat at a luxury hotel and spa. 
  
The retreats work to dissolve any sense of difference between public and 
private sector workers. From name badges that omit any details of 
participants to professional affiliations to comic ‘rituals’, such as the 
‘Sequins Only banquet’ (in which retreat participants dance around in 
‘goofy costumes’ and share sexualized humour), retreat activities establish 
a sense of shared ‘sisterhood’, uniting government and corporate 
personnel in what Alliance members describe as ‘the tax family’. 
However, in order to justify this all-female event as worthwhile to 
sceptical male colleagues, Alliance participants also work hard to ensure 
that ‘substantive’ issues are intensively discussed. 
  
This combination of activities brings several benefits to the corporate 
sector. It gives them a heads-up on forthcoming policy directions, but 
more importantly it grants them access to government. A legislative aide 
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describes how, in her busy schedule, she is more likely to respond to a 
phone call from a corporate lobbyist she knows through alliance activities 
than to members of the public or civic associations. ‘Relationships I have 
in the Tax Alliance sort of precipitate some of my business relationships’, 
she explains, ‘I know your issues, why don’t you come on in, two minutes 
and you know we can be out the door.’ The friendship, female solidarity, 
and professional familiarity that is fostered by Alliance activities gave 
corporate lobbyists disproportionate access to time-poor government 
officials, in ways that could be crucial in influencing policy.  
(drawn from Benoit 2007: 76-101) 
 
 
 
Example 2: Promoting Brazilian Sugarcane Ethanol  
As public concerns about climate change have driven governments in the 
global North to explore alternative energies to fossil fuels, opportunities 
have emerged for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, a type of ‘biofuel’, to 
become a global commodity. This prospect, however, is strongly opposed 
by environmentalist groups in the United States and Europe, who worry 
that sugarcane ethanol releases large amounts of greenhouse gases when 
burned and that its production could contribute directly and indirectly to 
deforestation of the Amazon.  
  
In order to counter such concerns, and convince Northern policy-makers 
to endorse their product, sugarcane industry professionals sought to enlist 
the support of scientists at the Brazilian Biofuel Institute. Although there 
was resistance at first, the scientists’ interests gradually aligned with those 
of the sugarcane business. Scientists and industry representatives shared a 
common sense of frustration at North Americans’ and Europeans’ 
ignorance regarding Brazil’s geography, which they felt had led the risks 
of deforestation to be overstated. The greenhouse gas argument was 
equally problematic: it represented double standards (since the countries 
that expressed concern about biofuel emissions were spending billions of 
dollars a year on crude oil), seemed unfair (since Brazil as a whole was a 
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carbon sink), and entirely ignored the social benefits that a booming 
sugarcane ethanol industry could bring. Some scientists even suspected 
that Northern ‘doubts’ over ethanol reflected a desire to impede Brazil’s 
growing global influence.  
  
Co-operating with industry leaders gave Brazilian scientists increased 
access to data, but it also helped them to communicate their knowledge to 
Northern policy-makers and international scientific communities in ways 
that would not have been possible had they been acting alone. As in 
Benoit’s example of the Tax Alliance, they drew on various forms of 
corporate hospitality and relationship building to influence policy 
outcomes, eventually encouraging the state of California to reclassify 
Brazilian ethanol as an advanced biofuel—though not all endeavours have 
been so successful.  
  
The case reveals how economic actors—and the scientists they mobilize—
can be driven by concerns that are far more complex than the profit 
motive. These include the desire to contribute to national development, 
sincere conviction that sugarcane ethanol is an environmentally sound fuel 
choice, and frustration at the skewed terms of an international debate 
which disproportionately reflects the (inaccurate and/or ethically 
problematic) concerns of actors from the global North. Scientists’ and 
sugarcane lobbyists’ use of quintessentially postdemocratic measures can 
be seen as a strategy by which they attempt to get their voices heard and 
their knowledge shared in arenas where they would otherwise be 
institutionally silenced.  
(drawn from Newberry 2015) 
 
 
 
Taken together, these two examples suggest that political anthropology has a vital role 
to play in moving discussions of postdemocracy beyond simplistic conceptions of 
‘expertise’ and ‘economic power’, illuminating the complex processes that determine 
how and why different private (and public) interests gain leverage in policy-making 
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processes. Ethnographic studies of this kind remain limited in number, but should be 
encouraged—not least because they can reveal how postdemocratic tendencies are 
symptomatic of other, more deeply embedded problems affecting governance. 
Example 1 showed how the time poverty of legislative aides was a fundamental block 
to civic groups being able to influence taxation policy; Example 2 showed how global 
biofuel policy conversations are structured in ways that delegitimize or marginalize 
scientific knowledge produced in the global South. Neither of these problems would 
be straightforwardly addressed by the structural solutions conventionally proposed as 
remedies for postdemocracy—such as curbs on corporate lobbying, or increased 
regulation of the private sector (e.g. Crouch 2004: 105-110). Indeed, in the biofuel 
example, such measures may even make the underlying problem even worse. While 
ethnographic research may not always offer immediate solutions, its commitment to 
understanding social worlds—even those of corporate lobbyists—from their 
inhabitants’ points of view can nevertheless complicate the conversation in ways that 
will ultimately prove productive in thinking about how to attain more just and 
considered forms of governance in our interconnected world. 
 
  
Market Solves? 
 
Crouch (2004: 39-43) also identifies several less direct ways in which the rise of ‘the 
firm’ has influenced contemporary governance. These are centred on a growing 
admiration for the corporate sector and the values it is purported to represent—
expertise, efficiency, and competitiveness—while the public sector is envisaged as 
sluggish and incompetent. Postdemocracy, in other words, often involves a cultural 
shift regarding what makes for good decisions—enforced by widely circulating anti-
populist discourses which stress that, on important matters such as the economy or 
environmental change, citizens should defer to government-recognized experts 
because ‘the people’ themselves lack ‘qualification to rule’ (Rancière 2011: 3; for 
examples, see Katsambekis 2014; Swyngedouw 2010). This has led not only to a 
decreased interest in public consultation but also a renewed interest in outsourcing 
aspects of public welfare provision to corporate actors, as this is believed to be a 
superior means of delivery. We see here, once again, the pursuit of a particular form 
of ‘disjunctive democracy’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998), in which one of the goals to 
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which an ‘ideal’ democracy might aspire (the answerability of a government to its 
citizens) has been downplayed in favour of another (perceived benefits to service 
provision). The advantage of political anthropology’s approach to such matters is that, 
rather than dismissing these visions of the polity out of hand (efficiency, after all, has 
its virtues; pure representation is not without its limitsvii) we can think more deeply 
about the ethical commitments that make them attractive and use ethnographic 
research to examine the degree to which these are realised in practice. 
 
 
Example 3: Education in Durham County, North Carolina  
In the 1980s, conservative politicians in North Carolina realized the poor 
quality of their local schools was thwarting their ambitions for economic 
growth. Without good schooling, it would prove difficult to attract 
businesses or relocating professionals to the region. They therefore 
suggested that business leaders should take a primary role in the 
formulation of educational policy. 
 
One man who did so was John, the white leader of Durham’s chamber of 
commerce, and parent to a school-aged child. This boy felt ambivalent 
about his schooling—he was thriving in those classes for which he had 
been placed in the ‘academically gifted’ stream, but reported that his 
learning was impeded by ‘disruptive students’ when he was assigned to 
‘regular’ classes, in which a significant number of pupils were from poor 
socioeconomic backgrounds and racial minorities. John was ‘bothered’ by 
his son’s experience, which found echoes in the tales of parents in the 
chamber, and this motivated him to use his position to get involved on a 
‘system-wide level’. He and other members of the chamber’s Public 
Education Committee decided to take action to address the levels of 
‘disruption’ in the school, proposing ‘alternative classroom settings’ for 
‘kids who disrupt so that ‘those who want to learn can learn’.  
  
This culminated in the provision of an ‘alternative school’ for which 
chamber members led fund-raising efforts. ‘Disruptive’ students—
overwhelmingly poor, black, male youth—were sent to this institution, 
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which lacked textbooks, pupil desks, windows in its classrooms, and had 
‘a decidedly penal feeling’ due to the constant presence of police officers 
on site. Worse still, the new school, which was located in a poor, black, 
neighbourhood, took up space that had previously been used by the 
community development volunteer coalition.  
 
Only after several years did a local judge intervene to demand the 
institution be re-examined. Tellingly, in the ensuing controversy, African 
American political activists indicted the white majority school board, the 
white superintendent, and the white-controlled public school system with 
condemning black youth to quasi-incarceration; the role of the chamber 
and of private business interests went unmentioned and undetected. 
(drawn from Bartlett et al. 2002; Holland et al. 2007) 
 
  
Several lessons can be drawn from this example. As the researching anthropologists 
concluded, by privileging the voices of business leaders (who are, of course, as this 
example shows, never just business leaders), the ‘personal, parental interests of 
middle-class, predominantly white chamber members were translated into new policy 
and institutions affecting black youth with minimal public involvement’ (Holland et 
al. 2007: 100). Moreover, this resulted in a worsening of educational  inequality, 
diminishing the ‘disruptive’ students’ chances of being able to enjoy the very benefits 
to socioeconomic citizenship that the postdemocratic measures had been implemented 
to achieve.  
 
But we can also see that the disastrous outcomes that Bartlett et al. (2002) describe 
arose as a result of social actors pursuing what they genuinely believed to be in the 
public interest. Believing educational success to be equally available to everyone, 
John was driven by a vision of ‘fair play’ that allowed him ‘to mistake white privilege 
for a greater willingness to work hard, and “disruption” for an individual’s free choice 
within a meritocratic institution’ (Holland et al. 2007: 100). Involving more poor, 
black voices in the debate—or even anthropological voices (see e.g. Fordham 1993; 
Lei 2003)—would quickly have complicated such assumptions. The same is true for 
public perceptions of postdemocratic measures. As the researchers write, ‘because we 
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think of schools as meritocratic institutions, business involvement with school issues 
is interpreted as socially progressive, when in fact steering of issues frequently results 
in less social mobility for subordinate race and class groups’ (Holland et al. 2007: 97).  
By doing ethnographic fieldwork, and capturing the experiences and voices of those 
whose perspectives would normally go unheard, political anthropology can expose the 
situatedness and potential blind-spots of the ideologies underpinning 
postdemocratization. Political anthropologists can even use those insights to advocate 
for change. This is the power of what Marcus and Fischer (1986) famously labelled 
‘anthropology as cultural critique’. In playing this role, moreover, anthropology 
reveals itself to be a fundamentally democratic discipline which, though by no means 
committed to majoritarian principles of representation, liberal models of democracy, 
or democratic statecraft, nevertheless believes in the importance of paying critical 
attention to as wide a variety of perspectives, and as great a multiplicity of expertises 
as possible in the pursuit of human flourishing. This is why postdemocratic 
developments, which silence the voices of the many in favour of the opinions of the 
few, must, even when well-intentioned, be something to which anthropologists are 
opposed.  
 
 
Renouncing Democracy 
 
The discussion so far has concerned cases where democracy has been gradually 
hollowed out. We have seen how social actors who, on various levels, may remain 
committed to ‘democracy’ as an ideal nevertheless act in ways that could be seen as 
‘undemocratic’—or at the very least in tension with democracy’s commitment to 
representation and opposition. In this next section, however, I want to explore cases 
where commitments to ideals of representation are not just overridden or 
compromised, but actively and deliberately abandoned by people who once embraced 
them. This is a phenomenon that has been witnessed across a number of so-called 
‘transitional democracies’—i.e. nations that adopted a structure of liberal democratic 
statecraft as part of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation. In a phenomenon that 
political scientist Larry Diamond (2008a) has variously termed ‘democratic rollback’ 
and ‘democratic recession’, an initial embrace of democracy has given way to a 
renewed desire for authoritarian leadership amongst the populace. This can be 
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evidenced in various ways. Barometer surveys of political attitudes might report 
growing percentages of a populations expressing dissatisfaction with democracy or, 
more likely, a preference for authoritarian alternatives—such as a strongman leader or 
a one-party system (see e.g. Chang et al. 2007). Alternatively one might track the 
improved fortunes and levels of support for ‘authoritarian’ politicians and policies in 
actual political systems. 
 
The interpretive challenge, however, is to understand precisely what is driving such 
patterns. Political scientists tend to explain them in terms of citizen dissatisfaction 
with democratic governance: an analytical approach inspired by classic rational 
choice theory. Authors such as Diamond (2008a) and Chang et al. (2007) have 
suggested that, when faced with disappointing levels of socioeconomic performance, 
or angered by the high levels of corruption believed to permeate democratic structures 
of government, citizens are drawn towards non-democratic alternatives. They see how 
‘authoritarian’ governments such as those in China and Singapore have been able to 
foster economic growth, and they may also look back with rose-tinted spectacles to 
the developmentalist authoritarian regimes under which they previously lived. Such 
feelings may only be compounded in circumstances where democratisation appears to 
have made a country beholden to the interests of international aid agencies and 
Western donors. On the basis of such an analysis, political scientists have often 
recommended what is essentially a structural solution. By tying development aid to 
democratic consolidation, they suggest, it may be possible to stamp out corruption, 
improve governmental performance, and win citizens back round to democracy as a 
political system (e.g. Davidson 2009; Diamond 2008a).  
 
In positing that socioeconomic aspects of citizenship have overtaken concern with 
political aspects, however, this argument—much like Holston and Caldeira’s 
conception of disjunctive democracies—assumes that citizens nevertheless retain a 
residual commitment to democracy as a political form. This may not always be the 
case. Democracy as a political system produces particular kinds of political 
personhood and forms of citizenship. Although these vary from context to context, 
they often share basic features: one is individualized, one’s voice carries equal weight 
to everyone else in society, one is able (and even expected to articulate ones own 
interests and desires, but is also expected to be deliberative and considerate of others’ 
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points of view. A key finding of anthropological studies of democracy is that while 
these modes of personhood may be embraced in some sociocultural contexts 
(Banerjee 2014; Witsoe 2011), in others they may be rejected, and seen as being in 
deep tension with local ideas about personhood, authority, and how decisions should 
be made (Ferme 1998; Hickel 2015).  
 
There is a risk here of framing analysis in the heavy-handed terms of ‘cultural values’, 
as if certain cultural contexts are simply ‘incompatible’ with (liberal) democracy. But 
given that ‘cultural values’ are themselves dynamic and constantly emergent (Stewart 
1996), a more helpful approach, to my mind, is one that asks how such 
incompatibilities are produced, sustained, or indeed transcended (Ahmad 2011). Such 
an enquiry can help to move us beyond the literature’s preoccupation with 
institutional democratic consolidation, revealing additional factors that inform the 
postdemocratization of citizens’ political horizons. 
 
 
Example 4: Postdemocratic Sentiment in Indonesia 
When I returned to Indonesia’s Riau Islands Province in 2011, five years 
after my first spell of long-term fieldwork, I was struck by how radically 
many people’s attitudes towards democracy had shifted. Islanders who had 
previously been committed democrats, enthusiastically experimenting 
with membership of political parties and participating in demonstrations 
now professed themselves to be deeply disillusioned, even anti-
democratic. Some were holding out hopes for a return to authoritarianism 
or the arrival of an Islamic caliphate; others had disengaged from the 
political process entirely, considering the cultivation of small businesses a 
more worthwhile use of their time. Though not universal, a significant 
minority of Riau Islanders appeared to hold such views. 
  
Concerns with corruption and—especially—socioeconomic performance 
were widely cited as reasons for citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy, 
seemingly corroborating Diamond’s ‘democratic recession’ hypothesis. 
But inconsistencies gradually began to emerge. The same people who 
condemned democracy for ruining the economy would at other times 
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reflect gratefully on how democratization had ushered in a time of 
economic prosperity—and yet they still wanted nothing more to do with 
‘democracy’. Thanks to the relationships cultivated by long-term 
fieldwork and the opportunities ethnographic research gave me to engage 
with people in a variety of contexts, I was able to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of what underpinned their postdemocratic 
sentiment. 
  
Postdemocrats were often people whose experiments with democracy had 
somehow failed. They were people who had initially envisaged a 
democratic future where they could express themselves, fight for justice, 
influence policy, or use their roles as gatekeepers to secure vital resources 
for their communities in exchange for votes. They were not, then, people 
whose ‘values’ were ‘incompatible’ with democracy. But when they had 
actually tried to do these things, the results had not been as they had 
hoped. A woman who had initially viewed democracy as an opportunity to 
secure resources for her ancestral community came to see it as a site of 
moral peril after an electoral candidate failed to fulfil promises she had 
made on his behalf whilst campaigning, implicating her in a web of deceit 
and sin. One young man had been excited about using his democratic 
voice to depose a corrupt official. But when his demonstrations were 
successful and this woman lost her job, he was racked with guilt over what 
he had done. The experience led him to consolidate his sense that his 
desires were dangerous and destructive, and needed to be controlled or 
hemmed in. Several of my older male informants, by contrast, had 
struggled to cope with having their opinions disregarded in the democratic 
marketplace of ideas, and now harboured fantasies of Indonesia becoming 
a military or theocratic state in which ‘the correct approach’ (which 
typically meant their approach) would be taken every time. Democracy 
had lost its appeal. 
(drawn from Long 2016) 
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In this example, a sense of incompatibility with democracy had arisen because the 
very projects of self-making that had initially driven Riau Islanders to embrace 
democracy had failed or backfired in deeply unpalatable ways. Although the self-
making ambitions that my informants held were clearly influenced by ideologies of 
authority, self-control and gender that had circulated widely under, and sometimes 
prior to, Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, it was also clear that they were 
deeply personal. This finding has several important implications.  
 
The first is methodological. It was only as I got to know people well that they would 
share the stories of their lives with me; sometimes telling me about their aspirations 
and hopes themselves quite explicitly, but more often making a series of throwaway 
remarks through which I could gradually assemble a sense of their motivations and 
concerns via a process of interpretation. This in itself points to one of the most 
important contributions that anthropologists can make to discussions of political life. 
Anthropologists are not just conduits for local knowledge, or pipelines through which 
the voices of marginalized people can be brought into academic debates within 
contemporary centres of power—although, as noted earlier, this is certainly an 
important aspect of our work. Anthropologists are also producers of knowledge, 
developing portraits of people and situations in which—if successful—one’s research 
participants might both recognize themselves and come to understand themselves in 
new ways. By drawing out truths that other people don’t (yet) know that they know, 
an interpretive political anthropology offers new lenses through which to think about 
familiar issues, driving both scholarly and political debate forward in productive new 
directions. 
 
This is certainly the case with postdemocratic sentiment in the Riau Islands. A quick, 
superficial survey of why enthusiasm for democracy was waning would doubtless 
pick up on the usual stereotypical answers: ‘The economy’s getting worse!’; ‘All this 
corruption!’. These were widespread narratives, uncontroversial and easily peddled—
perfect vehicles through which to express dissatisfaction with the status quo, but not 
necessarily reflective of the true roots of that dissatisfaction. The deeper subjective 
concerns that animated my informants’ political imaginations were not the kinds of 
things that one would immediately reveal to strangers conducting a political 
questionnaire, nor necessarily motives that could be confidently identified and 
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articulated by subjects themselves. Ethnographic fieldwork and anthropological 
interpretation thus both have crucial roles to play in capturing these more implicit 
motivational dynamics, and broadening debates over why postdemocratic sentiment 
should be on the rise. 
 
This in turn has practical implications for discussions of whether and how the 
democratic recession should be ‘stemmed’ (cf. Diamond 2008b). As noted earlier, 
these currently focus on the consolidation of democratic institutions. But if my 
analysis is correct, whilst such developments would no doubt be welcomed by 
postdemocratic Riau Islanders, they are not necessarily going to win them back to 
democracy’s cause. For that to happen, there would need to be either a profound shift 
in Riau Islanders’ conceptions of the sort of person that they ought (and want) to be, 
or the emergence of new modes of democratic practice that offer more satisfying 
experiences of living with others in the world. The insights borne of anthropological 
perspectives and fieldwork, in other words, do not just illuminate the causes of things. 
They can also be suggestive of productive new directions for activism and 
intervention. 
  
 
Conclusion: Political Anthropology for Postdemocratic Times 
 
At a time when authoritarianism is on the rise even in countries that have historically 
declared themselves its enemy, decisions about how to describe, analyse, and explain 
such a trend are strategic as much as they are intellectual. Publishing books with titles 
such as Post-democracy (Crouch 2004) or Democracy in Retreat (Kurlantzick 2013) 
has a similar rhetorical effect to #Occupy activists declaring that they—and passers-
by—are ‘the 99%’. These are arresting, alarming, provocations that discomfort those 
for whom ‘democracy’ and principles of popular sovereignty remain orienting 
normative ideals. As Ward (2009: 73) notes, whatever objections might be posed to 
the implicit temporality at the heart of the postdemocracy concept, the term has value 
in showing ‘how “thin” democracy has now become’. 
 
While this may be true, the classic narratives that accompany diagnoses of 
postdemocracy and democratic recession—usually accounts, one way or another, of 
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‘the political being entirely subordinated to the economic’ (Mendieta 2015: 204, on 
Crouch)—may not be the most helpful way to think about contemporary forms of 
political life. This is not because they are untrue. Indeed, they reveal something very 
telling and, to many, shocking about our current situation. But this very capacity to 
shock could be a weakness as much as a strength. As Gibson-Graham (1996: 125) 
notes, Leftist accounts that denounce the terrible effects of capitalist activity can 
inadvertently reify ‘capitalism’ as an unstoppable force, whilst alternative 
representations could allow us to see capitalist organisations as ‘fragile… spread out 
and potentially vulnerable’, nurturing hope in the possibility of positive change and 
inspiring new forms of activist strategy. Thinking in close ethnographic detail about 
how ‘postdemocratization’ occurs, both within the practice of statecraft and within 
citizens’ political aspirations, thus does more than add nuance to the existing work on 
postdemocracy in political science and critical theory. It also affords hope, offers new 
ways of thinking about how problematic tendencies in contemporary political life 
might be addressed, and invites consideration of measures that would supplement or 
even substitute for structural solutions. 
 
Studies of postdemocracy will always require the insights into the realpolitik of 
contemporary governance afforded by structural, political-economy approaches. 
When corporations, international financial organisations, or foreign donors exert 
significant control over a polity’s economic prospects—or, as in the case of Thailand, 
military and monarchical leaders have a de facto monopoly on the use of violent 
force—the demos has such little bearing upon the decision-making of a government 
held to ransom that it can hardly be considered sovereign. In such cases, 
anthropologists have a lot to learn form political scientists and relatively little to 
contribute—beyond, perhaps, analysis of how such dynamics play out in the context 
of their own fieldsite.  
 
But in many cases, the influence private interests exert over governmental decision-
making is far from guaranteed. Rather than a straightforward matter of ‘financial 
clout’, influence is an emergent outcome of particular practices within matrices of 
relationships; it can only be fully understood if its emergence is documented and 
analysed ethnographically. To get to the heart of postdemocracy, in other words, 
requires more than the insights afforded by political theory and political science. It 
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also requires a political anthropology. Moreover, while legislative curbs on corporate 
lobbying seem a distant prospect, ethnographic work can identify intermediate 
measures that might help redress what Crouch (2004: 46) terms the ‘democratic 
balance’ and not lead to private interests overriding civic concerns quite so 
dramatically. These could be as simple as changes in working hours to allow 
legislative aides more opportunity to engage with the public, or the promotion of new 
strategies by which civic groups try to cultivate relationships with those in power. The 
tools and tactics of postdemocracy, in other words, could themselves be democratised. 
 
That this approach was, in a way, adopted by Brazilian biofuel scientists and 
sugarcane lobbyists reminds us of a second main conclusion: that while 
postdemocratic tendencies have many negative effects, the people whose actions at 
their heart are complex ethical subjects, and even corporate activity may be driven by 
concerns that are far more varied and subtle than the ‘profit motive’. Many of these 
concerns could themselves be claimed as ‘democratic’. For Brazilian sugarcane 
industry professionals and scientists, they include national development, enhanced 
social wellbeing, and environmental justice. Business leaders in North Carolina 
doubtless thought they were contributing to a ‘democratic’ America, fighting against 
regional inequality by ensuring that local ‘kids who wanted to learn’ had the same 
opportunities to succeed as those in other parts of the USA. Indeed, a recent argument 
by Appel (2014) emphasizes that even bankers—who work in a profession often seen 
as the epitome of greed and self-interest—may be motivated by a desire to contribute 
to the democratisation of consumption and home ownership via the creation of new 
financial instruments such as derivatives. These people are not enemies but (potential) 
interlocutors. The problem is that when they become de facto sovereigns and political 
decision-makers, their actions may exacerbate inequalities and suffering in ways that 
they neither anticipate nor perceive. The challenge facing academics and activists 
who wish to develop a more participatory form of politics is to find ways in which 
such people’s energy and expertise can be harnessed, whilst allowing their ideas to be 
put into dialogue with alternative perspectives and to acquire authority through 
consensus rather through the positionality of their originator. This is not a 
straightforward process, although the #Occupy movement, in which working groups 
such as ‘Alternative Banking’ can discuss alternative, more equitable economic 
models, whilst ultimately remaining answerable to a General Assembly (see Appel 
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2014), provides a promising prefigurative model. In the meantime, anthropologists 
can make an important contribution by refraining from simply denouncing private 
sector activity as ‘corporate’—an analytical strategy that simply invites the defensive 
response that many people consider economic stability and growth to be very 
important—and instead highlighting how personal and situated the ‘expertise’ of 
business actors can be, calling attention to the perspectives and experiences that have 
been excluded by postdemocratic hierarchies of knowledge. While a receptive 
audience is by no means guaranteed, especially in a world dominated by knowledge 
paradigms that tend to dismiss ethnographic evidence as anecdotal, political 
anthropology has the capacity to disrupt the prevailing consensus and move 
discussions forwards in productive ways.  
 
A similar conclusion could be drawn from my final, Indonesian, example: although 
here political anthropology’s contribution comes not just from the exposure of 
subjugated knowledges but the production of new—anthropological—knowledge via 
the unique opportunities afforded by long-term fieldwork. I showed how both 
academic and policy approaches to ‘democratic consolidation’ have something to gain 
by engaging closely with the deep subjective concerns that animate citizens’ changing 
relations with ‘democracy’ as a political ideal. Rather than assuming democratic 
participation to be a near-universally accepted social good or dismissing certain 
cultures as irredeemably authoritarian, a layered and contextual ethnographic 
approach reveals the ways in which citizens might find democracy to be both 
desirable and harmful, opening up possibilities for thinking about, and perhaps 
supporting, ‘democratic’ reform on their terms rather than our own.  
 
Studying postdemocracy thus requires anthropologists to envisage their practice as 
one of double-sided critique, using the privileged perspectives afforded by immersive 
ethnographic research to expose and interrogate the latent assumptions embedded 
within the paradigms and principles that dominate both the contemporary drifts 
towards postdemocratic polities and current efforts to account for such 
transformations via grand narratives of ‘postdemocracy’, ‘the post-political’, or 
‘democratic recession’. By habilitating hitherto subjugated forms of knowledge, as 
well as advancing their own, political anthropologists can and should strive for more 
reflective and inclusive processes of policy decision-making, as well as advocating 
 25 
for explanatory models in the social sciences that, whilst acknowledging the 
constraints on thought and action posed by structural inequalities, embrace and seek 
to understand the messy complexity of how political horizons are shaped at every 
level from statesperson to citizen. In this regard, anthropological writing and 
intervention can itself be seen as a form of prefigurative politics, capable of fostering 
inclusiveness, representation and, where necessary, currents of agonistic opposition in 
an increasingly austere and postdemocratic world.  
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Notes: 
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i
 http://www.peoplesmomentum.com/about (accessed 21 March 2017). 
 
ii http://www.peoplesmomentum.com/about (accessed 6 November 2015). Since 
November 2015, the reference to a ‘micro level’ has been cut from the principal 
Momentum website—perhaps because it was being read in ways that suggested a lack of 
ambition. However, the idea that Momentum’s actions will embody and demonstrate the 
vitality of its politics remains intact. 
 
iii Notable examples include the UK Conservative Party’s U-turn on child tax credits 
when in government (2015), the UK Liberal Democrats’ U-turn on university tuition fees 
when in coalition (2010), and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s capitulation to the 
high-austerity terms of a bailout from the European Central bank, despite the Greek 
population having decisively voted to reject such an arrangement in a national 
referendum (2015). 
  
iv In my experience, those anthropologists who do have a facility with normative political 
argument have typically acquired this via their personal involvement in and engagement 
with the world of politics (whether as part of their fieldwork or outside the academy 
altogether) rather than as part of their professional training as anthropologists. Critical 
medical anthropologists, whose training equips them with an epidemiologically informed 
notion of the public good, are a partial exception.  
 
v On which, see (Dale 2011). 
 
vi Holston (2008: 311) defines these as extending justice and equality to the civil, 
socioeconomic, legal, and cultural aspects of citizenship, as much as to political aspects. 
 
vii As Remmer (1995) notes, states cannot be unswervingly representative of fluctuating 
political opinion: this would lead to such degrees of political buffeting that they would 
quickly become unstable. 
